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Abstract
There has recently been keen interest in the threat analysis of voting
systems. While it is important to verify the system itself, it has been
found that certain vulnerabilities only become apparent when taking a
“systems-based” view, i.e. considering interactions between the various
components of a scheme [13, 24]. Threat analysis has so far been of three
main forms: systems-based, protocol-level and taxonomy check-lists. We
discuss these approaches before presenting a model for analysis of voting
systems that essentially combines the first two methods, while avoiding
the repetition that can occur with the latter. The model is described
in detail, and demonstrated with an example from a case study of the
Ryan-Randell “Scratch Card” voting system [20].
1 Introduction
There has been a recent trend towards automated voting systems in an attempt
to improve the speed and accuracy of elections, and to encourage voter turn-out.
However, many of these new schemes have proven to be flawed, with cases of
election fraud, e.g. in the US [11, 22]. “Black box” systems are of particular
concern, e.g. those making use of Direct Recording Devices that give no proof
that a vote has been correctly recorded [14]. This has generated much interest
in research on verifiable voting systems, which have minimal reliance on the
players, i.e., voters, election officials, etc., and technical components, such as
the hardware and software behaving as intended. Notable examples are Preˆt a`
Voter [8], Punchscan [3], and VoteHere [4] all of which aim to provide a high
degree of transparency in the system. While cryptography is often used to
enable verifiability without compromising voter privacy, Rivest has shown with
the ThreeBallot voting system that this is not, in fact, an absolute necessity [21].
Despite the progress in developing high assurance voting systems, there is
nevertheless the need for careful analysis to ensure that requirements such as
eligibility, coercion-resistance and accuracy are met. In [13] Karlof et al. carried
out a systems-based analysis of Chaum’s visual crypto scheme [7] and Neff’s
original scheme [18, 17], i.e., taking into account interactions between the various
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components in each scheme. In doing so, they identified potential threats such as
subliminal channels and “social-engineering”-style attacks. In a similar analysis,
Ryan et al. [24] showed that Preˆt a` Voter [8], is robust against many of the
threats mentioned in [13], but identified further possible vulnerabilities such as
chain-voting and authority knowledge. See [24] for details.
Although highly useful, this type of analysis is rather ad-hoc and hence, may
not uncover all the possible threats in a scheme. At a lower level of abstraction, a
protocol-level analysis [19, 15] may be more systematic but interactions between
components are not as easy to visualise. Another approach is to develop a
“catalogue of threats” [1], but perhaps as a reflection of the immensity of this
task, aside from [2] there is little work to date in this direction.
In this paper, we propose a model for an analysis of threats in voting sys-
tems that is essentially “systems-based”, but considerably more systematic than
previous similar work [13, 24]. While [2] has a largely technical focus and con-
centrates on DRE systems, our model operates at a higher level of abstraction
and is not scheme-specific.
In this model, the main components of a scheme such as the ballot form,
voting booth, etc. are identified, and the possible threats to each component,
at each phase of the protocol are considered in turn. In this way, it provides a
guideline for evaluation of the system with the detail of a protocol-level analy-
sis, but at the same time taking interactions between the various components
directly into consideration. An advantage of this model is that apart from of-
fering a more systematic approach to analysis, the components can be selected
as appropriate and thus, tailored to the scheme being analysed. In addition,
by working through the threat categories in the model, and at the same time
applying appropriate reasoning to the scheme, the analyst is arguably better
able to identify new threats than if using a catalogue of threats.
We have striven to keep the model as general as possible, hence, it can be
used for a range of different systems: from manual, paper-based voting, such
as the current UK system, to more sophisticated systems that incorporate, e.g.
voting devices and verifiable receipts.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we desribe the model
in detail, and in Section 3, explain how it might be used to analyse a voting
system. In Section 4 we discuss the results and possibilities for future work.
2 A Model for Analysis of Voting Systems
We introduce the model in a step-wise manner, beginning with a simple manual
voting system, such as the one currently used in the U.K. We then extend this
model to include the capability for automated vote recording and tallying, a
paper audit trail and verifiability via receipts which the voter can check against
a Web bulletin board after a vote is cast. As will be seen shortly, this is done
by adding the necessary components. Hence, the model offers a high degree of
modularity, as the components can be selected as appropriate to the scheme
being analysed.
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To derive the model, we first examined the main phases in a typical voting
protocol: voting and tallying. As is the case in most current voting systems, we
assume that the pre-election set-up has taken place. Typically, the electoral roll
would have been established, and could include setting up of cryptographic keys,
printing of paper ballot forms, ensuring that ballot boxes are empty, etc. We
also assume that there is a registration process in which voters are authenticated
and checked for eligibility. Note however, that a more complete analysis of a
voting scheme should also include these processes. We consider them as future
extensions to the model.
Taking a high-level view of the protocol, we then isolated the main compo-
nents involved with each phase. The components in the model will be described
in detail shortly. Working through the steps in the voting protocol, we identified
possible threats that could occur directly in relation to each component. As we
only consider the immediate threats, we avoid the tendency for repetition that
can occur when compiling a catalogue of threats.
For uniformity, the possible threats were organised into threat categories,
such as “ballot stuffing”, “absence of verifiability”, etc. Although certain threat
categories do appear in several components, we only consider the threats that
are directly applicable in each case. In an analysis, it is important that the
details of the particular scheme be considered with care when deciding whether
or not a particular threat category applies, and if so, the way in which the
threat may be manifested. It is possible that not all the threat categories in
the model will apply in each case, as this clearly depends on the scheme being
analysed. However, identifying robustness against a particular threat is useful
in highlighting the strengths of a scheme.
Note that we do not directly identify the players in a voting scheme, such as
the voters and election officials. However, as will be seen shortly, many of the
threats in our model can arise from interactions between certain players and the
above components. Note also that we define the components in terms of the
generic case, which could be adapted according to the particular system under
analysis.
For example, evaluating the threats arising from storage of votes during the
voting phase will depend on whether ballot forms are cast into a ballot box or
whether votes are recorded on a memory card. The general threat categories
are covered by the ballot storage component.
The present model excludes remote voting systems, as this adds considerable
complexity to ensuring the coercion-resistance of a scheme. Instead, we start
with a model for analysis of booth-based systems, and consider remote voting
as a future extension.
2.1 The Base Voting Model
In the base model, we identify two phases in the protocol: voting and tallying.
A description of the system, along with the main components involved at each
phase, is as follows:
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During the voting phase, the voter marks her choice on the ballot form in a
booth, then exits and casts the marked form in a ballot box. An official ensures
that she casts one ballot form only, but should not be able to learn her vote
choice or to link the voter to her cast ballot form. Here, the main components
are the voting booth, ballot form and ballot box.
Tallying commences after the close of voting. Ballot boxes are collected and
transferred to a designated tallying place. Officials open the ballot boxes and
count the votes, watched by a team of observers. Local results are collated, and
the final tally is published. The main components involved are the voting booth,
ballot form, ballot box and the election results. As we aim for generality with
the model, the components are chosen by taking a high-level view of a system.
We next describe the components in terms of their main functions and se-
curity requirements. This is necessary for determining relevant threats.
Ballot form - Record the voter’s candidate choice(s). Once the
voter has marked her choice, it should not be possible to modify it.
There should be no way to link a ballot form to a voter after it has
been cast.
Ballot storage - Securely store the cast ballot forms. No voter
should be able to cast more than one ballot form into the box, and
it should not be possible to insert fake votes.
Voting booth - Provide privacy while the voter marks the ballot
form. A voter should be able to make her selection without outside
interference, and there should be no opportunity to monitor or record
the process.
Election results - The final count of all (legitimate) votes.
Having established the basis for an analysis of threats to a voting system,
we now present the first elements of our model. The possible threats associated
with each component are given in Figures 1 - 4. There are several points to
clarify. Firstly, note that in Figure 1 we list possible threats that could arise
from both a paper ballot form and one that is generated by a device. We discuss
the differences in Section 3. Secondly, in Figure 3, we show possible threats
to a ballot storage component to allow a later extension for automated vote
recording. Thirdly, for generality, we have included threats that would apply to
schemes that are more sophisticated than the paper-based manual system, such
as those that make use of encryption.
Finally, for all components in the model, the property violated is listed
alongside each threat. Here, we consider the main properties required of secure
systems, i.e., confidentiality, integrity and availability, rather than the tradi-
tional requirements of voting systems such as ballot secrecy, accuracy, verifia-
bility, etc [15, 10]. The latter could be regarded as specialisations of the former,
and we find that they are rather too fine-grained for a generic model. This is
particularly true of voting system requirements which tend to “overlap”, such
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Threat Property violated
Identifiable information added by voter/official
Voter identifiable from ballot form
Authority knowledge Confidentiality
Voter’s choice incorrectly represented
Ballot form spoiled Integrity
Ballot form faked
Figure 1: Ballot form
Threat Property violated
Voter’s activity monitored Confidentiality
Voter’s records own choice
Voter’s choice influenced Integrity
Voter smuggles out unmarked ballot form
Figure 2: Voting booth
as coercion-resistance and receipt-freeness. A system may for instance satisfy
receipt-freeness, but not coercion-resistance.
It is worth noting that some threats potentially violate more than one prop-
erty, e.g. chain-voting and early publishing of the election results can undermine
both integrity and confidentiality. However, we list these threats under integrity,
which could be considered as the top-level requirement of an election: that the
final count should accurately reflect the true intention of the voters. In a chain-
voting attack, the coercer obtains a fresh ballot form and marks his choice. He
then threatens or bribes a voter to cast it at the polling station, in return for
an unused form. Hence, one or more voters may be coerced into voting in a
certain way, against their free will. Partial results published ahead of time may
influence voters who have not yet cast their votes. At the same time, an attacker
may be able to make inferences about the identities of voters who have voted
or have yet to vote. Clearly, confidentiality is also at risk in both cases.
Threat Property violated
Ballot stuffing Integrity
Ballot spoiling
Figure 3: Ballot storage
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Threat Property violated
Early publishing Integrity
Absence of verifiability
False/erroneous count
Figure 4: Election results
We next extend the base model by adding a voting device for automated
vote recording.
2.2 Extension 1: Adding a Voting Device
A description of a generic scheme using a voting device is given below.
The device authorises the voter, and then presents the vote choices to the
voter. She makes her selection, e.g. on a touchscreen, which the device writes
to a storage medium, such as a memory card.
We make several assumptions in this extension to the base model. Firstly,
that during registration the voter optionally receives a device, e.g. smartcard or
one-time password which she presents to the voting machine during authorisa-
tion. Secondly, that the device is located in a booth, and the voter is checked
against the electoral list during the authorisation process. Further, that the
storage media are collected at the end of the voting phase.
After the voting phase has ended, officials collect the storage media from each
of the voting machines. The media are transferred to a device which extracts
and counts the votes. Note that although we have not identified the counting
device as a component, possible threats introduced to a scheme are covered by
the election results “component”. As before, the results are collated, and the
final tally is published. Note that there could be a network of local counters,
or a central counter. With the former, there is possibly greater opportunity for
data corruption in transit or early publishing of election results.
Note that the model is still useful for schemes such as Preˆt a` Voter in which
the device only scans the voter’s receipt, as the possible threats can be evaluated
as appropriate. This is illustrated shortly in an analysis of the ”Scratch Card”
voting system which is based on Preˆt a` Voter.
The functions and requirements of the voting device and storage medium
are given below.
Voting device - Authorise the voter and present vote choices.
Record the voter’s choice and write to storage media. It should not
be possible to add any identifying information to a vote choice, al-
ter, duplicate or delete it. The device should not be able to generate
fake votes.
Although the function of the storage medium is analogous to the
ballot storage component described previously, we re-state them in
terms of the physical differences to facilitate visualisation of poten-
tial threats.
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Threat Property Violated
Identifiable information added Confidentiality
Voter’s activity monitored
Faulty authorisation Integrity
Voter’s choice incorrectly/not recorded
Denial of service Availability
Figure 5: Voting device
Storage medium - Store the voter’s choice. Once written to the
medium, it should not be possible to alter or delete any data.
The device should be protected against any tampering. Likewise
data transfer at the end of the voting period.
Potential threats introduced by adding a device are given in Figure 5.
2.3 Extension 2: Adding a Paper Audit Trail
A second extension to the base model is a Paper Audit Trail. With a Voter
Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) [16] mechanism, a paper copy is made
of the voter’s selection and verified by the voter. The copies are securely stored
as a back-up in case a manual re-count is necessary, e.g. if automated tallying
fails or if the final tally appears suspicious in any way.
We assume that the voting device, such as the one in Section 2.2, produces a
printed receipt for each vote cast. As in the “Mercuri Method” [16], the device
displays the receipt under a clear screen. The voter verifies the receipt, which
is then placed mechanically in a sealed box so that the voter cannot leave the
polling station with it. The idea is that if the receipt is incorrect, an official
could void the entry and provide the voter with another chance to vote. This
is clearly a risk to voter privacy as indicated in the model.
Similar to a VVPAT, a Verifiable Encrypted Paper Audit trail (VEPAT) [23]
acts as a paper back-up in case a manual recount of votes is necessary, but is
intended for schemes in which the voter’s choice is encrypted. Since copies are
made of an encrypted vote, the risk to voter privacy is reduced. Since the threats
specific to a VEPAT will be covered by the ballot form component, both types
can be analysed using the same component in the model.
Possible threats to a scheme arising from the paper audit trail are shown in
Figure 6.
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Threat Property violated
Voter identifiable from receipt Confidentiality
Voter’s choice noted by official
Mismatch between voter’s choice and paper copy Integrity
Figure 6: Paper audit trail
2.4 Extension 3: Adding a Web Bulletin Board (WBB)
and Verifiable Receipts
A final extension to the base model is a WBB and verifiable receipts. This is to
enable the analysis of schemes which allow verifiability without compromising
voter privacy, such as Preˆt a` Voter. In such schemes the voter receives a receipt,
which may bear an encrypted value, e.g. the voter’s selection. Ideally, there
should be mechanisms that allow the voter to check that her vote has been
encrypted correctly. She later checks her receipt against a WBB to ensure that
it has been correctly recorded by the system. However, the ThreeBallots scheme
enables verifiability without the use of encryption. To achieve this, ballot forms
are constructed in such a way that the portion retained by the voter as a receipt
cannot be used as proof of a vote. Details can be found in [21].
In schemes which utilise encryption, the encrypted votes are typically passed
through anonymising tabulation servers before final tallying. The final count is
posted to a WBB, so can be verified by anyone. Further details can be found
in e.g. [8, 7, 5, 9]. Note that the model can be used for schemes which do
not use cryptography, as the possible threats can be evaluated as appropriate.
This is illustrated in a forthcoming paper in which we use our model to analyse
potential threats in Preˆt a` Voter and the ThreeBallots scheme: the former uses
encryption, whereas the latter does not. The unifying requirement is that it
should not be possible to link the voter’s receipt to her (unencrypted) vote.
However, with the possibility of verifying a receipt, coercion becomes a serious
potential threat. This is identified in our model, and discussed in Section 3.
The WBB and verifiable receipt are defined below. Possible threats arising
from these components are given in Figures 7 and 8.
Verifiable receipt - Enables the voter to check that her vote has
been correctly recorded by the system, without compromising voter
privacy. There should be proof of authenticity, such as a verifiable
digital signature, so that neither the system nor the voter can falsely
claim that the receipt is invalid. It should not be possible for the
voter to prove her vote using the receipt.
WBB - This should be a publicly-accessible, write-only medium.
The voter should be allowed access to verify that her receipt has
been correctly recorded by the system. In addition, anyone should
be able to verify that the intermediate decryptions of encrypted votes
and/or the final tally is correct from postings to the WBB.
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Threat Potential threat
Voter identifiable from receipt
Authority knowledge Confidentiality
Receipt discarded/ surrendered Integrity
Invalid signature
Faked receipt
Figure 7: Verifiable receipt
Threat Potential threats
Monitoring access to the WBB Confidentiality
Voter presented with fake WBB Integrity
WBB modified
Denial of service Availability
Figure 8: WBB
This completes the model, and in the next section, we discuss ways in which
it may be used. Note that the model does not include certain threats such as
forced abstention due to, e.g. shortage of election equipment, complicated voter
registration, etc., as these are generally due to forces outside the system, and
need to be addressed by means other than improvements in the protocol.
3 Applying the Model
In this section, we describe the way in which our model could be used to identify
potential threats in the “Scratch Card” voting system [20]. This is a version of
Preˆt a` Voter [8], which aims to promote voter understandability. The scheme
offers receipt-freeness and limited voter verifiability without the use of encryp-
tion. It provides a good exemplar for an analysis as all the various components
in the model can be demonstrated to their full extent.
3.1 Threat Analysis of the Ryan-Randell “Scratch Card”
Voting System
An overview of the scheme is as follows. The voter randomly chooses a ballot
form, an example of which is shown in Figure 9. A randomised candidate list
is printed in the left hand column (LHC). Below this is a code identification
number (CIN): the key to the candidate ordering. The same CIN appears at
the foot of the right hand column (RHC), but is concealed with a scratch strip.
Overprinted on the scratch strip is the receipt identification number (RIN).
In the privacy of the booth, the voter marks an “X” against her chosen can-
didate in the RHC. The LHC is detached and dropped into a clearly-marked
LHC ballot box. Outside the booth, and in the presence of an official, a pho-
tocopy is made of the RHC, while the original goes into a clearly-marked RHC
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King
Queen
Knight
Rook
513170 (CIN) 023169 (RIN)
Figure 9: Scratch Card ballot form
X
023169 (RIN)
Figure 10: Photocopied receipt
ballot box. The voter retains the photocopy as a receipt (see Figure 10), and
can use it to check that her “encrypted” vote has been correctly recorded by
the system. For example, the RIN and position of the “X” could be shown on
a publicly-accessible Web bulletin board (WBB).
At the close of voting, the scratch strips are removed from each RHC, re-
vealing the CIN as shown in Figure 11. The votes can then be recovered by
matching the LHCs to the corresponding RHCs.
Ballot auditing is carried out under the supervision of officials pre-, post- and
during the election period. Voters and independent auditors take random ballot
forms, scratch off the RINs and check that the CINs match the corresponding
candidate order. Although the scheme boasts simplicity, the unwieldy tabula-
tion process is a disadvantage. In addition, voters must rely on the correctness
of the tabulation as the scheme does not provide verifiability of the final tally.
See [20] for a discussion.
We now carry out a threat analysis of the scheme, first identifying the main
components from the model: the ballot form, booth, ballot storage, voting device,
verifiable receipt, WBB and election results.
X
513170 (CIN)
Figure 11: Countable vote
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3.1.1 Ballot form
Threats to confidentiality:
• Identifiable information added - Only the RIN and numerical value of
voter’s mark is recorded, so unless the correspondence between CIN and
candidate order is leaked by the authority or the CIN-RIN noted by an
official (see below), the receipt cannot later be identified.
• Voter identifiable from ballot form - A potential threat. The CIN-RIN
correspondence of a voter’s ballot form could be noted by a dishonest
official, who then observes the tabulation process and discovers the vote.
A possible countermeasure is to have the CINs in the LHCs covered by
scratch strips, which would only be removed during the tabulation process.
• Authority knowledge is a potential threat, as information about CIN-RIN
pairings could be leaked during storage and distribution.
It is interesting to note that in identifying the voter from information on a
legally marked ballot form, the attacker makes use of a subliminal channel. In
contrast, if a voter is identified from e.g./ marks added to the ballot form by a
dishonest official, the information flow is via an illegal channel.
Threats to integrity:
• Voter’s choice incorrectly represented - A possible threat if the CIN does
not correspond to the candidate order. However, this should be caught
during the random pre-audit of ballot forms.
It is important to ensure that ballot forms are not re-used once they have
been used for checking, as the CIN-RIN correspondences will have been
revealed.
• Ballot form spoiled - Not a threat, assuming the honesty of officials who re-
move the scratch strips during tabulation. However, see potential threats
arising from the ballot storage below.
• Ballot form faked - This could be done with knowledge of how CINs are
formed, but the chance of a faked ballot being caught during auditing
should act as a deterrent. Anti-counterfeiting devices would be another
possible mitigation against this attack. Note that [20] does not describe
formation of the CINs.
3.1.2 Voting booth
Threats to confidentiality
• Voter monitored - A possible threat, e.g. with a hidden camera in the
booth.
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• Voter’s records own choice - A possible threat, e.g. by using a camera
phone.
Note that the above would be threats in almost any scheme, but should
nevertheless be evaluated in an analysis.
• Voter smuggles out unmarked ballot form - Chain-voting is a potential
threat. The coercer marks the ballot and can later check the RIN of that
ballot against the WBB, to ensure that the voter has complied with his
instructions.
Threats to integrity:
• Voter choice influenced - A possible threat, e.g. by a subliminal message
in the booth.
3.1.3 Ballot box
Threats to integrity:
• Ballot stuffing - This could be carried out e.g. by corrupt officials
• Spoiling - A possible threat, e.g. ballot forms could be lost or substituted
by an attacker. Having a VVPAT mechanism [16] in place is a possible
mitigation.
Both attacks would require a certain amount of coordination as the CINs and
RINs on the faked/substituted LHCs and/or RHCs would have to be correctly
matched. The suggested mitigation in [20] is for LHCs and RHCs to be handled
by independent authorities.
3.1.4 Voting device
Threats to confidentiality:
• Identifiable information added by device - As the device only scans the
receipt this is not a particular problem.
• Voter choice incorrectly/not recorded - This is a possible threat, but would
be discovered if voters are diligent in checking their receipts on the WBB.
Another countermeasure is to have a VVPAT mechanism in place.
• Voter’s activity monitored - This could be carried out e.g. via wireless
connection, but as long as the CIN-RIN pairings are not revealed until
the time of counting, the voter’s choice cannot be learned from the RHC
scanned by the device.
Threats to integrity:
• Faulty authorisation - Since the device does not authorise the voter, this
is not a threat to the scheme.
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Threats to availability:
• DoS - A possible threat, e.g. due to device failure. However, the voter
does not face the possibility of losing a vote if unable to scan her receipt,
as may be the case with some touchscreen voting machines.
3.1.5 Verifiable receipt
Threats to confidentiality:
• Voter identifiable from receipt - This is not a threat (assuming correct
operation of the scheme) as the LHCs and RHCs are both cast at the
time of voting, and the voter cannot prove correspondence between RIN
and candidate order. However, this is a potential threat if an official
notes the CIN-RIN correspondence on the voter’s ballot form. A possible
countermeasure is for both the CIN and RIN to be covered with scratch
strips.
Randomisation attacks are also possible. With this, an attacker could re-
quire e.g. that the first candidate is marked, regardless of which candidate
ordering is used. The level of threat is determined by the extent a voter
can pick a ballot of her own choosing and the number of candidates in an
election. In the case of few candidates, it might be easy for the voter to
pick a ballot where she can vote as she wishes while satisfying the coercer.
A randomisation attack may benefit the low key candidates as the votes
would be spread evenly across the candidates. In addition, a voter could
prove her vote to a corrupt official who matches the LHC and RHC during
vote counting.
• Discarded receipts/surrendered receipts may indicate receipts that will
not be checked and hence could be altered without detection. A possible
countermeasure is to have a VVPAT-style mechanism in place.
Threats to integrity:
• Invalid signature - A possible threat if the mechanism for digitally signing
receipts is malicious or fails. Likewise the mechanism for checking the
signature on a receipt. The voter is then unable to prove an incorrectly
recorded receipt.
• Fake receipt - Voter could falsely claim to be disenfranchised with a fake
receipt. A suggested mitigation is to frank the receipts [20].
For both the above, a possible countermeasure is to digitally sign the
receipts and then have immediate checks on the signatures.
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3.1.6 WBB
Threats to confidentiality:
• Monitoring access to the WBB - This is not a particular threat as without
knowledge of the CIN-RIN pairings, the value of the voter’s vote cannot
be learned from postings to the WBB.
Threats to integrity:
• The voter could be presented with a fake WBB, e.g. in a spoofing attack,
and be misled into believing her vote has been recorded correctly when in
reality, it has been changed.
• WBB modified - There is a risk that the WBB could be modified after the
voter has checked her receipt. However, an attacker set on altering the
election results would not actually need to do so, since the scheme does
not, in any case, provide verifiability of the final tally.
For both the attacks, a VVPAT mechanism is a possible countermeasure.
Threats to availability:
• DoS - A possible threat, e.g. due to network overload, power failure, etc.
3.1.7 Election results
Threats to integrity:
• Early publishing - A potential threat. To mitigate this, vote counting at
local stations, the final tally and publishing of results should be carefully
synchronised.
• Absence of verifiability - As the voter is only able to check that her receipt
has been correctly recorded on the WBB, this should be regarded as a
potential threat.
• False/erroneous count - There is a danger that this could go undetected,
as the scheme offers limited verifiability. Again, a VVPAT mechanism is
a possible countermeasure.
From the analysis above, it is clear that having a VVPAT mechanism in
place would counter many of the threats to the integrity of the scheme. We
next investigate whether or not this would add any further threats.
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3.1.8 Paper audit trail
Threats to confidentiality:
• Voter identifiable from receipt - See the “verifiable receipt” component
above for a discussion of this potential threat.
• Voter’s choice noted by official - This is not a threat assuming the scheme
operates as intended. However, the above also applies.
Threats to integrity:
• Mismatch between voter’s choice and paper copy - Not a threat, as in the
“Scratch Card” scheme, two copies could be made of the RHC: one of
which the voter retains as a receipt, the other to act as a paper back-up.
It appears that a VVPAT mechanism would not introduce any additional
threats, at least threats that may not have been present before. However, it
may magnify any existing threats to confidentiality.
The analysis shows that the main problems with the scheme are firstly, that
it only offers partial verifiability as the voter is only able to verify that her
receipt has been correctly recorded by the system. Secondly, the voter may be
open to coercion if the CIN-RIN correspondence on her ballot form, together
with her ID is noted by an official. While a possible countermeasure for the
latter has been suggested, the former requires trust in the correctness of the
tabulation process.
The analysis also demonstrates that the model offers a systematic way to
carry out a threat analysis of voting systems, i.e., by identifying the main phases
and components in a scheme, and evaluating potential threats in direct relation
to each component during a run of the protocol, taking into account its particu-
lar design aspects. We have aimed for generality so that the model is adaptable,
and found this to be the case in the analysis of the “Scratch Card” scheme. The
appropriate components could be readily selected from the model, and the vul-
nerabilities evaluated against the threat categories provided.
It should be noted that while every effort has been made to ensure com-
pleteness of our model, given the open-endedness of systems it is difficult to
guarantee that it captures all possible threats.
In the next section we discuss the results and mention some limitations of
the work.
4 Discussion and Future Work
We have presented a model for the systematic analysis of threats to voting
systems that can be applied to a wide range of different schemes. This is further
demonstrated in a forthcoming paper in which we use the model to analyse
potential threats in Preˆt a` Voter [8] and the ThreeBallot voting scheme [21].
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In anticipation of some of these threats, error detection mechanisms have
been built into many current schemes, e.g. randomised partial checking [12]
of the mix process to ensure correct decryption of votes without compromising
voter privacy. While a systematic threat analysis is valuable for identifying
the need for error detection mechanisms, it can also be useful for assessing the
effectiveness of any that are existing within the scheme, especially when taking
interactions between the various players and components into consideration.
A further step from an analysis such as the one performed above could
involve assessing the likelihood of certain threats occurring. This goes beyond
the model: not only assessing the potential threats but also the probability
of their occurrence, and could involve a more complex and informed analysis
of the scheme in relation to both the sociological and technical aspects of its
environment. Estimating the security of a scheme would then require balancing
the probability of the threats occurring against the effectiveness of any error
detection mechanisms that may be in place. Bryans et al. discuss this issue
in [6], and make a distinction between accidental and malicious error. Our
model can be used for analysing potential threats through accident or malice,
e.g. a user interface could be deliberately confusing, or confusing due to poor
design.
Bryans et al. also mention the need to consider threats to the reputation of
a voting system [6]. Interestingly, transparency in a voting scheme could work
against it, e.g. a large number of reported errors in recorded votes could dissuade
voters from using it, and cause it to be abandoned altogether. As previously
mentioned, there has been a recent move towards increased transparency in
voting systems as a way to provide verifiability and to reduce dependency on
the “correctness” of the system. However, possible threats to the reputation
of the system are worth careful consideration. Although we briefly touched on
this issue in the previous section, our model does not directly analyse threats
to reputation, as this lies outside the current (largely technical) scope. Once
again, the analyst would need to merge the sociological and technical aspects of
a scheme in assessing the strength of its reputation.
Another important point raised in [6] is the importance of error handling and
recovery strategies, alongside error detection mechanisms. This is a currently
neglected field in research on voting systems, and error handling and recovery
is lacking in many current voting schemes. This is a highly complex issue,
involving decisions not only on the way in which recovery should be effected,
but also when the appropriate mechanisms should be invoked. It is likely that
decisions would have to be made as to when margins of error are regarded
as insignificant, and when they become unacceptable. Patterns of error may
have to be studied, e.g. in deciding whether a particular error is accidental or
malicious. This may, in turn, affect decisions on how best to deal with the error.
It would be highly useful to have a systematic model not only for the threat
analysis, but also for dealing with any errors or security breaches that may occur
as a result of these threats. This could take the form of a model for the analysis
of potential threats based on the components in a scheme, in conjunction with
a series of “decision trees” offering possible ways to handle such threats should
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they occur. We envisage this as a possible extension of our model, and a subject
of future work.
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